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15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Research and Reports

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

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1. Problem:

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a. To evaluate the economic and geographic positive intelligence potential of the [REDACTED] now being exploited by the [REDACTED] and the degree to which this potential is or could be realized.

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2. Assumptions:

none

25X1X6 3. Facts Bearing on the Problem:



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g. GRR has no direct representation in the [redacted] and has been relying on the written requirements medium to guide the interrogation of sources for economic and geographic intelligence.

h. GRR has provided the [redacted] a list of priority interests and a list of priority installations in the USSR in which it is interested. In addition, it has been providing, on request from [redacted] requirements for specific sources or for those sources which [redacted] has felt would be of priority interest to GRR. [redacted] has forwarded all other GRR requirements which have been served on it for action where it has felt the ERIC had some potential to meet the requirements.

i. To date, evaluation of reporting received by GRR from this interrogation program reveals that much of the information is of value, and some of exceptional value. It appears, however, that many of the [redacted] have not been fully exploited for information which, according to their background description, they should have.

j. In a limited number of special cases, where it would be particularly valuable, [redacted] who have already been interrogated can be recalled [redacted] for re-interrogation.

k. Members of [redacted] expressed a strongly felt need for additional help and a particular need for expertise on economic intelligence.

4. Discussion:

a. In recent years, reliable primary sources of intelligence on the USSR have been drying up. In contrast the [redacted] situation has made available a large number of individuals who have spent most of their lives in the USSR. The vast majority of these individuals were [redacted]

[redacted] They were raised in the USSR by Russians, as Russians, and learned to think like Russians. They were completely integrated into Soviet society. In effect, they constitute a cross-section of Soviet society and, collectively, have a store of knowledge on the USSR that has been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have access to in the past.

b. Of the [redacted] approximately [redacted] have been screened by [redacted] to determine intelligence potential. Of this number, approximately [redacted] had been interrogated by [redacted]

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14 March 1958. According to a survey conducted by the [redacted] on 14 March 1958, the 580 who had been screened were broken down into the following categories, according to skills (see attachment A for detail): (1) professional (those individuals who have had college education - total number 147 (25.3%); (2) skilled (those individuals who had no college training but who have been trained in some technical skill, for example mechanics, machine operators and so forth) - total number 257 (44.3%); (3) unskilled (those individuals who have not had a college education and have not been trained in any special skill) - total number 176 (30.3%).

c. The Departments of Air Force and Army consider this interrogation program important to the extent that Air Force has provided the Center three interrogators, and Army has provided two and expects to provide two more in the immediate future. [redacted] itself, has provided six interrogators to exploit for positive intelligence. At the moment, CIA has one interrogator in the unit interrogating for positive intelligence and provides the clerical, reports, and requirements staff for the project. The [redacted] interrogators are not experienced in intelligence interrogation and are quite lacking in knowledge of intelligence needs on the USSR. Thus, a good portion of the Requirements Officer's time is spent in training and guiding the [redacted]

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d. The procedure for exploiting these [redacted] is as follows: the [redacted] police [redacted] or in the provinces contact the returnee and ask him to fill out an [redacted] questionnaire. This questionnaire resembles to a remarkable degree [redacted] that are used by

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[redacted] After the questionnaire is completed it is sent to the [redacted] where it is screened to determine the value of [redacted] from an intelligence point of view. If it is determined that the source is worth interviewing, and this determination is made almost entirely on the basis of written requirements that have been received from Washington, then the [redacted] is invited to come to [redacted] for an interview. This screening, selection, and scheduling of sources for interrogation is done primarily by the Requirements Officer. The [redacted] estimates that approximately 99 percent of those invited come. Many of these are not cooperative and no pressure can be applied. Some "un-cooperative" types will open up if they take a liking to the interrogator. Many of the [redacted] estimated at several hundred, who did not like [redacted] have returned to the USSR. Since the danger is always present that [redacted] who have been interviewed by the [redacted] may return to the USSR, interrogators have to be especially careful that they do not reveal too much of the methods and needs of US intelligence.

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Under the present system, prior to the arrival of the [redacted] in [redacted] an exploitation plan is drawn up. The [redacted] Requirements Officer is to search through all requirements on hand and compile

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into one list these he feels are suitable to the returnee's experience and knowledge. Unfortunately, due to physical security problems, the bulk of the requirements files are not kept in immediate access to the interrogation center. In those cases where the returnee is to be interviewed by a [REDACTED] the Requirements Officer translates the requirements into [REDACTED]. In the vast majority of cases, interviews with the returnees are conducted in [REDACTED]. It has been profitable in many cases, however, to revert to the Russian language when discussing some technical aspect of a job in which the returnee was engaged.

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e. At the present time, the [REDACTED] is processing about ten returnees a week. The positive intelligence program is expected to run from one to three years. All of the present Agency staff is used

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f. Discussions with [REDACTED] reveal that they have only a general understanding of the missions of economic and geographic intelligence and little appreciation for the specific requirements of economic and geographic intelligence. The specific source requirements which are developed from the general type guide requirements and the subsequent interrogations quite naturally are limited by this lack of expertise and the resulting field reports are likewise deficient. They have an immediate need for a highly-trained individual in these fields, particularly Soviet economics, to give them daily guidance on selection and exploitation of these sources. In discussing this problem with them it is obvious that they feel that this is a serious gap in their interrogation effort. This point has subsequently been discussed with some of the people [REDACTED] concerned with the project. These people encouraged further support to the project in terms of economic expertise.

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g. To date, ORR has received 99 reports from the exploitation [REDACTED]. Reports of this group were disseminated to 23 separate ORR branches. A survey undertaken to determine the value of this reporting to ORR reveals the following:

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(1) Of 18 branches surveyed, 7 (Guided Missiles, Military Economics, Aircraft, Construction, Transportation, Population, and the Soviet Branch of Geography Division) felt that reporting had been valuable, and in some cases of exceptional value, but that interrogators had not exploited the full potential of the individual returnees. They felt that interrogators who were fully

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segment of economic and geographic interests could have obtained much more pertinent and valuable information.

(2) The 7 branches which felt that reporting was valuable also stated that the potential that existed in this program could be more fully exploited by having an OER man in the program. Four of these branches (OO/S, I/OA, S/TH, S/CST) felt quite strongly that this was the only real solution to the problem of getting what was needed from the program.

(3) Of these 7 branches, 4 had a sample of 10 or more reports on which to base their evaluation. The remaining 3 branches had a sample of from 5-8 reports for use as a base. (Median number of reports per branch was 14 plus.)

(4) Of the 9 branches (Medium Machinery, Transport and Heavy Machinery, Chemicals, Ferrous Metals, Organizations and Management, Fuels and Power, Electrical Equipment, Shipbuilding and the USSR Branch of Analysis Division) which felt that reporting from the returnees was mediocre, duplicative of other reporting, or dated, 4 had a sample of 10 or more reports on which to base their evaluations and the remaining 5 had a sample of from 2-9 reports for use as a base. (Median number of reports per branch was 9.)

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5. Conclusions:

a. [REDACTED] represent a unique potential source of relatively current (1956-57) information on the USSR.

b. The proportion of professional level sources is appreciably higher than previously thought.

c. Many of the low-level sources reveal valuable information under qualified interrogation.

d. Only a small number of reports have been received to date by OER but these have been of value and in some cases of exceptional value.

e. Valuable economic and geographic intelligence information is not being obtained because of a lack of knowledge and appreciation by the interrogators of economic and geographic intelligence needs. The limit of indirect and remote headquarters guidance has been virtually reached through the provision of written requirements and guides.

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f. The efficiency of the present operation is impaired by an imbalance between interrogation capacity versus requirements and guidance.

g. The intelligence potential (even if the return of additional, even more valuable, sources does not occur as now anticipated) of the project warrants continuous on-the-spot assistance by CEN participants.

6. Recommendation:

a. That CEN provide a highly qualified individual, and slot if necessary, for FOS 2 year assignment to the [REDACTED] This individual's primary duties would be: (1) Assist the project Requirements Officer in (a) the selection of sources, (b) preparation of tailored requirements, (c) instruction of the [REDACTED] (2) Provide guidance to all interrogators and to the Reports Officer on economic and geographic intelligence needs and on the interpretation and evaluation of such information as reported; (3) Participate in the interrogation of particularly unique and valuable sources for economic or geographic information as they might occur.

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<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>PROFESSIONAL</u>	<u>SKILLED</u>	<u>UNSKILLED</u>	<u>INTERROGATED</u>
Agriculture	11	8	3	1
Tax Agency	1	6	2	1
Aviation No. 30	0	13	4	8
Aviation No. 45	0	11	1	7
Aviation No. 451	0	1	1	2
Fact. Auto No. 182	0	2	0	1
Bolshevik Fact.	0	2	4	3
Boriseh Fact.	0	9	1	3
Serp I Molot, (Metallurgy)	0	2	1	1
Krasni Proletary	0	9	1	7
Metallurgy, Artemovsk	1	1	1	1
Metallurgy, Dnepropetrovsk	1	5	3	1
Metallurgy, Dneprodzerzhinsk	0	4	0	1
Molotov Auto., Gorki	2	2	0	2
Bearing Fact. No. 2 Moscow	0	7	2	3
Bearing Fact. No. 11 Minsk	0	3	1	1
Internal Grinding Machines, No. 221	0	5	1	3
Optical Fact; Izyum	0	3	2	1
Proletarskiy Trud; Nails & Screws	0	2	1	1
Guided Missiles No. 456, Jinki	3	4	0	7
Textile, Moscow	0	4	7	1
Textile, Tbilisi	0	1	8	1
Textile, Various	0	1	12	1
Auto Repair Fact.	1	9	0	0
ZIL, Moscow	4	16	5	7
Aviation	1	3	1	1
General Industry;	7	44	33	23
Sugar Fact.				
Rubber Fact.				
Agriculture Machines; Etc.				

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Attachment A
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<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>PROFESSIONAL</u>	<u>SKILLED</u>	<u>UNSKILLED</u>	<u>UNEMPLOYED</u>
Chemistry Industry	0	3	2	0
Koljos	2	1	1	0
Institute Foreign Languages, Moscow	11	0	0	0
Medicine & Health	14	5	0	0
Military	2	0	0	0
Mines	1	3	2	1
Liberal Professions (including economic)	17	0	0	0
Sovjet	1	1	0	0
Moscow University	3	20	0	0
Science	3	0	0	0
Construction	3	7	7	0
Foreign Languages				
Editions	2	3	0	1
Electronics & Comm.	4	0	0	4
Electric Energy	7	7	2	6
Teaching	16	0	0	1
Apprentice School	0	1	0	0
Comm. & Transport.	5	7	5	6
Various	25	22	53	8
Musicians, Priests, Sick, etc.				

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Attachment 2

Implementation

The following steps would be required to implement the recommendation:

- (a) Selection of the individual.
- (b) Discussion of the individual with SR/Requirements and OR/S to gain their preliminary endorsement.
- (c) Memorandum from AD/ER through DD/I; through Chief [REDACTED] to Chief [REDACTED] proposing the assignment of an ORG man to [REDACTED] (This would be a brief of the ongoing study.)
- (d) Upon agreement by Chief, [REDACTED] memorandum to DD/S establishing the position.
- (e) Training of individual. Including detailed briefing in all ORG functional branches plus [REDACTED] plus briefings in OSI and OOI. Assignment of individual to [REDACTED] for requirements and reports training prior to departure. If time permits it would also be desirable for the individual to have some interrogation training.

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Attachment C

General

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This is in essence a one-shot deal, not continuing. I'm sure [redacted] would welcome such an assignment. We should push for relatively free substantive correspondence by the individual with ORR headquarters. This man should be [redacted] right now, so the sooner the better. The man must be qualified in [redacted] and in Soviet economic intelligence and have a personality which will fit in with the [redacted] and with the [redacted]. He should also have at least a fair reading knowledge of Russian and preferably some speaking ability. We have some qualified people (i.e., [redacted]) who are also very valuable here. I don't know who else we might have, but suspect there are a few others who might do.

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I considered but discarded the idea of sending somebody for 60 days TDY -- because I'm sure we would want to extend him and then we would have family and other problems such as at [redacted]

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